

# **EXHIBIT 28**

## Unauthorized SIM Swaps


### Issue:

- SMS being used as a “second step” Authentication for high profile accounts – Social Media Accounts, Crypto Currency, Financial Accounts.
- However, SMS was not designed for “proof of possession.” SIM authentication is designed for this and being delivered via [REDACTED]

### Threat Actor Tactics:

- Objective is to perform SIM Swap to enable capture of SMS bound for Victim handset.
- Method is to social engineer Authorized Retail Employees by prompting employee to visit a phishing site to harvest their credentials/Secure ID Passcode then gain OPUS access.
- Expected Tactical Migration is towards bribes/extortion and malware.

### Trends:



Unauthorized SIM Swaps – decreasing due to mitigations

### Detection & Mitigation Capabilities:

#### OPUS:

- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

#### CSO:

- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

**Protection Activities Underway:**

[REDACTED]

**Tactical Recommendations:**

[REDACTED]

ts)  
s.

**Strategic Recommendations:**

- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

